CAT 2022 Slot 1 question paper with answer key

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question. Passage - I Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order. Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere that masses are organized − whether it be Foucault‘s prisons or Habermas‘s public sphere − the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a “project” as the basis of what he called rather confusingly “technological rationality.” Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task. In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories. As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society. This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is depicted in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.

The management of a university hockey team was evaluating performance of four women players - Amla, Bimla, Harita and Sarita for their possible selection in the university team for next year. For this purpose, the management was looking at the number of goals scored by them in the past 8 matches, numbered 1 through 8. The four players together had scored a total of 12 goals in these matches. In the 8 matches, each of them had scored at least one goal. No two players had scored the same total number of goals. The following facts are known about the goals scored by these four players only. All the questions refer only to the goals scored by these four players. 1. Only one goal was scored in every even numbered match. 2. Harita scored more goals than Bimla. 3. The highest goal scorer scored goals in exactly 3 matches including Match 4 and Match 8. 4. Bimla scored a goal in Match 1 and one each in three other consecutive matches. 5. An equal number of goals were scored in Match 3 and Match 7, which was different from the number of goals scored in either Match 1 or Match 5. 6. The match in which the highest number of goals was scored was unique and it was not Match 5.

The management of a university hockey team was evaluating performance of four women players - Amla, Bimla, Harita and Sarita for their possible selection in the university team for next year. For this purpose, the management was looking at the number of goals scored by them in the past 8 matches, numbered 1 through 8. The four players together had scored a total of 12 goals in these matches. In the 8 matches, each of them had scored at least one goal. No two players had scored the same total number of goals. The following facts are known about the goals scored by these four players only. All the questions refer only to the goals scored by these four players. 1. Only one goal was scored in every even numbered match. 2. Harita scored more goals than Bimla. 3. The highest goal scorer scored goals in exactly 3 matches including Match 4 and Match 8. 4. Bimla scored a goal in Match 1 and one each in three other consecutive matches. 5. An equal number of goals were scored in Match 3 and Match 7, which was different from the number of goals scored in either Match 1 or Match 5. 6. The match in which the highest number of goals was scored was unique and it was not Match 5.

The management of a university hockey team was evaluating performance of four women players - Amla, Bimla, Harita and Sarita for their possible selection in the university team for next year. For this purpose, the management was looking at the number of goals scored by them in the past 8 matches, numbered 1 through 8. The four players together had scored a total of 12 goals in these matches. In the 8 matches, each of them had scored at least one goal. No two players had scored the same total number of goals. The following facts are known about the goals scored by these four players only. All the questions refer only to the goals scored by these four players. 1. Only one goal was scored in every even numbered match. 2. Harita scored more goals than Bimla. 3. The highest goal scorer scored goals in exactly 3 matches including Match 4 and Match 8. 4. Bimla scored a goal in Match 1 and one each in three other consecutive matches. 5. An equal number of goals were scored in Match 3 and Match 7, which was different from the number of goals scored in either Match 1 or Match 5. 6. The match in which the highest number of goals was scored was unique and it was not Match 5.

The management of a university hockey team was evaluating performance of four women players - Amla, Bimla, Harita and Sarita for their possible selection in the university team for next year. For this purpose, the management was looking at the number of goals scored by them in the past 8 matches, numbered 1 through 8. The four players together had scored a total of 12 goals in these matches. In the 8 matches, each of them had scored at least one goal. No two players had scored the same total number of goals. The following facts are known about the goals scored by these four players only. All the questions refer only to the goals scored by these four players. 1. Only one goal was scored in every even numbered match. 2. Harita scored more goals than Bimla. 3. The highest goal scorer scored goals in exactly 3 matches including Match 4 and Match 8. 4. Bimla scored a goal in Match 1 and one each in three other consecutive matches. 5. An equal number of goals were scored in Match 3 and Match 7, which was different from the number of goals scored in either Match 1 or Match 5. 6. The match in which the highest number of goals was scored was unique and it was not Match 5.

The management of a university hockey team was evaluating performance of four women players - Amla, Bimla, Harita and Sarita for their possible selection in the university team for next year. For this purpose, the management was looking at the number of goals scored by them in the past 8 matches, numbered 1 through 8. The four players together had scored a total of 12 goals in these matches. In the 8 matches, each of them had scored at least one goal. No two players had scored the same total number of goals. The following facts are known about the goals scored by these four players only. All the questions refer only to the goals scored by these four players. 1. Only one goal was scored in every even numbered match. 2. Harita scored more goals than Bimla. 3. The highest goal scorer scored goals in exactly 3 matches including Match 4 and Match 8. 4. Bimla scored a goal in Match 1 and one each in three other consecutive matches. 5. An equal number of goals were scored in Match 3 and Match 7, which was different from the number of goals scored in either Match 1 or Match 5. 6. The match in which the highest number of goals was scored was unique and it was not Match 5.

Adhara, Bithi, Chhaya, Dhanavi, Esther, and Fathima are the interviewers in a process that awards funding for new initiatives. Every interviewer individually interviews each of the candidates individually and awards a token only if she recommends funding. A token has a face value of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, or 13. Each interviewer awards tokens of a single face value only. Once all six interviews are over for a candidate, the candidate receives a funding that is Rs.1000 times the product of the face values of all the tokens. For example, if a candidate has tokens with face values 2, 5, and 7, then they get a funding of Rs.1000 × (2 × 5 × 7) = Rs.70,000. Pragnyaa, Qahira, Rasheeda, Smera, and Tantra were five candidates who received funding. The funds they received, in descending order, were Rs.390,000, Rs.210,000, Rs.165,000, Rs.77,000, and Rs.66,000. The following additional facts are known: 1. Fathima awarded tokens to everyone except Qahira, while Adhara awarded tokens to no one except Pragnyaa. 2. Rashida received the highest number of tokens that anyone received, but she did not receive one from Esther. 3. Bithi awarded a token to Smera but not to Qahira, while Dhanavi awarded a token to Qahira but not to Smera.

Adhara, Bithi, Chhaya, Dhanavi, Esther, and Fathima are the interviewers in a process that awards funding for new initiatives. Every interviewer individually interviews each of the candidates individually and awards a token only if she recommends funding. A token has a face value of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, or 13. Each interviewer awards tokens of a single face value only. Once all six interviews are over for a candidate, the candidate receives a funding that is Rs.1000 times the product of the face values of all the tokens. For example, if a candidate has tokens with face values 2, 5, and 7, then they get a funding of Rs.1000 × (2 × 5 × 7) = Rs.70,000. Pragnyaa, Qahira, Rasheeda, Smera, and Tantra were five candidates who received funding. The funds they received, in descending order, were Rs.390,000, Rs.210,000, Rs.165,000, Rs.77,000, and Rs.66,000. The following additional facts are known: 1. Fathima awarded tokens to everyone except Qahira, while Adhara awarded tokens to no one except Pragnyaa. 2. Rashida received the highest number of tokens that anyone received, but she did not receive one from Esther. 3. Bithi awarded a token to Smera but not to Qahira, while Dhanavi awarded a token to Qahira but not to Smera.

Adhara, Bithi, Chhaya, Dhanavi, Esther, and Fathima are the interviewers in a process that awards funding for new initiatives. Every interviewer individually interviews each of the candidates individually and awards a token only if she recommends funding. A token has a face value of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, or 13. Each interviewer awards tokens of a single face value only. Once all six interviews are over for a candidate, the candidate receives a funding that is Rs.1000 times the product of the face values of all the tokens. For example, if a candidate has tokens with face values 2, 5, and 7, then they get a funding of Rs.1000 × (2 × 5 × 7) = Rs.70,000. Pragnyaa, Qahira, Rasheeda, Smera, and Tantra were five candidates who received funding. The funds they received, in descending order, were Rs.390,000, Rs.210,000, Rs.165,000, Rs.77,000, and Rs.66,000. The following additional facts are known: 1. Fathima awarded tokens to everyone except Qahira, while Adhara awarded tokens to no one except Pragnyaa. 2. Rashida received the highest number of tokens that anyone received, but she did not receive one from Esther. 3. Bithi awarded a token to Smera but not to Qahira, while Dhanavi awarded a token to Qahira but not to Smera.

Adhara, Bithi, Chhaya, Dhanavi, Esther, and Fathima are the interviewers in a process that awards funding for new initiatives. Every interviewer individually interviews each of the candidates individually and awards a token only if she recommends funding. A token has a face value of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, or 13. Each interviewer awards tokens of a single face value only. Once all six interviews are over for a candidate, the candidate receives a funding that is Rs.1000 times the product of the face values of all the tokens. For example, if a candidate has tokens with face values 2, 5, and 7, then they get a funding of Rs.1000 × (2 × 5 × 7) = Rs.70,000. Pragnyaa, Qahira, Rasheeda, Smera, and Tantra were five candidates who received funding. The funds they received, in descending order, were Rs.390,000, Rs.210,000, Rs.165,000, Rs.77,000, and Rs.66,000. The following additional facts are known: 1. Fathima awarded tokens to everyone except Qahira, while Adhara awarded tokens to no one except Pragnyaa. 2. Rashida received the highest number of tokens that anyone received, but she did not receive one from Esther. 3. Bithi awarded a token to Smera but not to Qahira, while Dhanavi awarded a token to Qahira but not to Smera.

Adhara, Bithi, Chhaya, Dhanavi, Esther, and Fathima are the interviewers in a process that awards funding for new initiatives. Every interviewer individually interviews each of the candidates individually and awards a token only if she recommends funding. A token has a face value of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, or 13. Each interviewer awards tokens of a single face value only. Once all six interviews are over for a candidate, the candidate receives a funding that is Rs.1000 times the product of the face values of all the tokens. For example, if a candidate has tokens with face values 2, 5, and 7, then they get a funding of Rs.1000 × (2 × 5 × 7) = Rs.70,000. Pragnyaa, Qahira, Rasheeda, Smera, and Tantra were five candidates who received funding. The funds they received, in descending order, were Rs.390,000, Rs.210,000, Rs.165,000, Rs.77,000, and Rs.66,000. The following additional facts are known: 1. Fathima awarded tokens to everyone except Qahira, while Adhara awarded tokens to no one except Pragnyaa. 2. Rashida received the highest number of tokens that anyone received, but she did not receive one from Esther. 3. Bithi awarded a token to Smera but not to Qahira, while Dhanavi awarded a token to Qahira but not to Smera.

There are 15 girls and some boys among the graduating students in a class. They are planning a get-together, which can be either a 1-day event, or a 2-day event, or a 3-day event. There are 6 singers in the class, 4 of them are boys. There are 10 dancers in the class, 4 of them are girls. No dancer in the class is a singer. Some students are not interested in attending the get-together. Those students who are interested in attending a 3-day event are also interested in attending a 2-day event; those who are interested in attending a 2-day event are also interested in attending a 1-day event. The following facts are also known: 1. All the girls and 80% of the boys are interested in attending a 1-day event. 60% of the boys are interested in attending a 2-day event. 2. Some of the girls are interested in attending a 1-day event, but not a 2-day event; some of the other girls are interested in attending both. 3. 70% of the boys who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 60% of the girls who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 4. No girl is interested in attending a 3-day event. All male singers and 2 of the dancers are interested in attending a 3-day event. 5. The number of singers interested in attending a 2-day event is one more than the number of dancers interested in attending a 2-day event.

There are 15 girls and some boys among the graduating students in a class. They are planning a get-together, which can be either a 1-day event, or a 2-day event, or a 3-day event. There are 6 singers in the class, 4 of them are boys. There are 10 dancers in the class, 4 of them are girls. No dancer in the class is a singer. Some students are not interested in attending the get-together. Those students who are interested in attending a 3-day event are also interested in attending a 2-day event; those who are interested in attending a 2-day event are also interested in attending a 1-day event. The following facts are also known: 1. All the girls and 80% of the boys are interested in attending a 1-day event. 60% of the boys are interested in attending a 2-day event. 2. Some of the girls are interested in attending a 1-day event, but not a 2-day event; some of the other girls are interested in attending both. 3. 70% of the boys who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 60% of the girls who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 4. No girl is interested in attending a 3-day event. All male singers and 2 of the dancers are interested in attending a 3-day event. 5. The number of singers interested in attending a 2-day event is one more than the number of dancers interested in attending a 2-day event.

There are 15 girls and some boys among the graduating students in a class. They are planning a get-together, which can be either a 1-day event, or a 2-day event, or a 3-day event. There are 6 singers in the class, 4 of them are boys. There are 10 dancers in the class, 4 of them are girls. No dancer in the class is a singer. Some students are not interested in attending the get-together. Those students who are interested in attending a 3-day event are also interested in attending a 2-day event; those who are interested in attending a 2-day event are also interested in attending a 1-day event. The following facts are also known: 1. All the girls and 80% of the boys are interested in attending a 1-day event. 60% of the boys are interested in attending a 2-day event. 2. Some of the girls are interested in attending a 1-day event, but not a 2-day event; some of the other girls are interested in attending both. 3. 70% of the boys who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 60% of the girls who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 4. No girl is interested in attending a 3-day event. All male singers and 2 of the dancers are interested in attending a 3-day event. 5. The number of singers interested in attending a 2-day event is one more than the number of dancers interested in attending a 2-day event.

There are 15 girls and some boys among the graduating students in a class. They are planning a get-together, which can be either a 1-day event, or a 2-day event, or a 3-day event. There are 6 singers in the class, 4 of them are boys. There are 10 dancers in the class, 4 of them are girls. No dancer in the class is a singer. Some students are not interested in attending the get-together. Those students who are interested in attending a 3-day event are also interested in attending a 2-day event; those who are interested in attending a 2-day event are also interested in attending a 1-day event. The following facts are also known: 1. All the girls and 80% of the boys are interested in attending a 1-day event. 60% of the boys are interested in attending a 2-day event. 2. Some of the girls are interested in attending a 1-day event, but not a 2-day event; some of the other girls are interested in attending both. 3. 70% of the boys who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 60% of the girls who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 4. No girl is interested in attending a 3-day event. All male singers and 2 of the dancers are interested in attending a 3-day event. 5. The number of singers interested in attending a 2-day event is one more than the number of dancers interested in attending a 2-day event.

There are 15 girls and some boys among the graduating students in a class. They are planning a get-together, which can be either a 1-day event, or a 2-day event, or a 3-day event. There are 6 singers in the class, 4 of them are boys. There are 10 dancers in the class, 4 of them are girls. No dancer in the class is a singer. Some students are not interested in attending the get-together. Those students who are interested in attending a 3-day event are also interested in attending a 2-day event; those who are interested in attending a 2-day event are also interested in attending a 1-day event. The following facts are also known: 1. All the girls and 80% of the boys are interested in attending a 1-day event. 60% of the boys are interested in attending a 2-day event. 2. Some of the girls are interested in attending a 1-day event, but not a 2-day event; some of the other girls are interested in attending both. 3. 70% of the boys who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 60% of the girls who are interested in attending a 2-day event are neither singers nor dancers. 4. No girl is interested in attending a 3-day event. All male singers and 2 of the dancers are interested in attending a 3-day event. 5. The number of singers interested in attending a 2-day event is one more than the number of dancers interested in attending a 2-day event.

Given above is the schematic map of the metro lines in a city with rectangles denoting terminal stations (e.g. A), diamonds denoting junction stations (e.g. R) and small filled-up circles denoting other stations. Each train runs either in east-west or north-south direction, but not both. All trains stop for 2 minutes at each of the junction stations on the way and for 1 minute at each of the other stations. It takes 2 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in east-west direction and 3 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in northsouth direction. From each terminal station, the first train starts at 6 am; the last trains leave the terminal stations at midnight. Otherwise, during the service hours, there are metro service every 15 minutes in the north-south lines and every 10 minutes in the east-west lines. A train must rest for at least 15 minutes after completing a trip at the terminal station, before it can undertake the next trip in the reverse direction. (All questions are related to this metro service only. Assume that if someone reaches a station exactly at the time a train is supposed to leave, (s)he can catch that train. )

Given above is the schematic map of the metro lines in a city with rectangles denoting terminal stations (e.g. A), diamonds denoting junction stations (e.g. R) and small filled-up circles denoting other stations. Each train runs either in east-west or north-south direction, but not both. All trains stop for 2 minutes at each of the junction stations on the way and for 1 minute at each of the other stations. It takes 2 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in east-west direction and 3 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in northsouth direction. From each terminal station, the first train starts at 6 am; the last trains leave the terminal stations at midnight. Otherwise, during the service hours, there are metro service every 15 minutes in the north-south lines and every 10 minutes in the east-west lines. A train must rest for at least 15 minutes after completing a trip at the terminal station, before it can undertake the next trip in the reverse direction. (All questions are related to this metro service only. Assume that if someone reaches a station exactly at the time a train is supposed to leave, (s)he can catch that train. )

Given above is the schematic map of the metro lines in a city with rectangles denoting terminal stations (e.g. A), diamonds denoting junction stations (e.g. R) and small filled-up circles denoting other stations. Each train runs either in east-west or north-south direction, but not both. All trains stop for 2 minutes at each of the junction stations on the way and for 1 minute at each of the other stations. It takes 2 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in east-west direction and 3 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in northsouth direction. From each terminal station, the first train starts at 6 am; the last trains leave the terminal stations at midnight. Otherwise, during the service hours, there are metro service every 15 minutes in the north-south lines and every 10 minutes in the east-west lines. A train must rest for at least 15 minutes after completing a trip at the terminal station, before it can undertake the next trip in the reverse direction. (All questions are related to this metro service only. Assume that if someone reaches a station exactly at the time a train is supposed to leave, (s)he can catch that train. )

Given above is the schematic map of the metro lines in a city with rectangles denoting terminal stations (e.g. A), diamonds denoting junction stations (e.g. R) and small filled-up circles denoting other stations. Each train runs either in east-west or north-south direction, but not both. All trains stop for 2 minutes at each of the junction stations on the way and for 1 minute at each of the other stations. It takes 2 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in east-west direction and 3 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in northsouth direction. From each terminal station, the first train starts at 6 am; the last trains leave the terminal stations at midnight. Otherwise, during the service hours, there are metro service every 15 minutes in the north-south lines and every 10 minutes in the east-west lines. A train must rest for at least 15 minutes after completing a trip at the terminal station, before it can undertake the next trip in the reverse direction. (All questions are related to this metro service only. Assume that if someone reaches a station exactly at the time a train is supposed to leave, (s)he can catch that train. )

Given above is the schematic map of the metro lines in a city with rectangles denoting terminal stations (e.g. A), diamonds denoting junction stations (e.g. R) and small filled-up circles denoting other stations. Each train runs either in east-west or north-south direction, but not both. All trains stop for 2 minutes at each of the junction stations on the way and for 1 minute at each of the other stations. It takes 2 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in east-west direction and 3 minutes to reach the next station for trains going in northsouth direction. From each terminal station, the first train starts at 6 am; the last trains leave the terminal stations at midnight. Otherwise, during the service hours, there are metro service every 15 minutes in the north-south lines and every 10 minutes in the east-west lines. A train must rest for at least 15 minutes after completing a trip at the terminal station, before it can undertake the next trip in the reverse direction. (All questions are related to this metro service only. Assume that if someone reaches a station exactly at the time a train is supposed to leave, (s)he can catch that train. )