CAT 2023 Slot 1 question paper with answer key

Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . . The differences between the current economies of North and South Korea cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between them They are instead due entirely to the different government policies….. At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography……. Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding Here the explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists. Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . . Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today. Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted…... But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason. A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship …… Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.

Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . . The differences between the current economies of North and South Korea cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between them They are instead due entirely to the different government policies….. At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography……. Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding Here the explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists. Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . . Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today. Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted…... But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason. A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship …… Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.

Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . . The differences between the current economies of North and South Korea cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between them They are instead due entirely to the different government policies….. At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography……. Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding Here the explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists. Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . . Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today. Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted…... But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason. A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship …… Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.

Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . . The differences between the current economies of North and South Korea cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between them They are instead due entirely to the different government policies….. At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography……. Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding Here the explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists. Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . . Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today. Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted…... But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason. A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship …… Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.

RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy. Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1. 1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe —hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations. As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.

RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy. Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1. 1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe —hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations. As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.

RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy. Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1. 1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe —hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations. As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.

RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy. Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1. 1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe —hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations. As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.

For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually concerned with national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward- looking. My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad who have centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking –full of movement, border-crossing and southsouth interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anti-capitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . . The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book….. For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those commonly found ones are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in my book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world. This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. ……. African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.

For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually concerned with national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward- looking. My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad who have centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking –full of movement, border-crossing and southsouth interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anti-capitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . . The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book….. For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those commonly found ones are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in my book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world. This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. ……. African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.

For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually concerned with national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward- looking. My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad who have centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking –full of movement, border-crossing and southsouth interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anti-capitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . . The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book….. For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those commonly found ones are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in my book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world. This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. ……. African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.

For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually concerned with national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward- looking. My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad who have centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking –full of movement, border-crossing and southsouth interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anti-capitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . . The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book….. For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those commonly found ones are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in my book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world. This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. ……. African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.

Fifty years after its publication in English in 1972, and just a year since Marshall Sahlins himself died—we may ask: why did his essay “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . . Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . . But the point of the essay is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities. With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . . Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.

Fifty years after its publication in English in 1972, and just a year since Marshall Sahlins himself died—we may ask: why did his essay “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . . Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . . But the point of the essay is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities. With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . . Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.

Fifty years after its publication in English in 1972, and just a year since Marshall Sahlins himself died—we may ask: why did his essay “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . . Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . . But the point of the essay is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities. With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . . Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.

Fifty years after its publication in English in 1972, and just a year since Marshall Sahlins himself died—we may ask: why did his essay “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . . Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . . But the point of the essay is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities. With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . . Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.

The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4) given below, when properly sequenced, would yield a coherent paragraph. Decide on the proper sequencing of the order of the sentences and key in the sequence of the four numbers as your answer.

Faculty members in a management school can belong to one of four departments – Finance and Accounting (F&A), Marketing and Strategy (M&S), Operations and Quants (O&Q) and Behaviour and Human Resources (B&H). The numbers of faculty members in F&A, M&S, O&Q and B&H departments are 9, 7, 5 and 3 respectively. Prof. Pakrasi, Prof. Qureshi, Prof. Ramaswamy and Prof. Samuel are four members of the school's faculty who were candidates for the post of the Dean of the school. Only one of the candidates was from O&Q. Every faculty member, including the four candidates, voted for the post. In each department, all the faculty members who were not candidates voted for the same candidate. The rules for the election are listed below. 1. There cannot be more than two candidates from a single department. 2. A candidate cannot vote for himself/herself. 3. Faculty members cannot vote for a candidate from their own department. After the election, it was observed that Prof. Pakrasi received 3 votes, Prof. Qureshi received 14 votes, Prof. Ramaswamy received 6 votes and Prof. Samuel received 1 vote. Prof. Pakrasi voted for Prof. Ramaswamy, Prof. Qureshi for Prof. Samuel, Prof. Ramaswamy for Prof. Qureshi and Prof. Samuel for Prof. Pakrasi. Which two candidates can belong to the same department?

Faculty members in a management school can belong to one of four departments – Finance and Accounting (F&A), Marketing and Strategy (M&S), Operations and Quants (O&Q) and Behaviour and Human Resources (B&H). The numbers of faculty members in F&A, M&S, O&Q and B&H departments are 9, 7, 5 and 3 respectively. Prof. Pakrasi, Prof. Qureshi, Prof. Ramaswamy and Prof. Samuel are four members of the school's faculty who were candidates for the post of the Dean of the school. Only one of the candidates was from O&Q. Every faculty member, including the four candidates, voted for the post. In each department, all the faculty members who were not candidates voted for the same candidate. The rules for the election are listed below. 1. There cannot be more than two candidates from a single department. 2. A candidate cannot vote for himself/herself. 3. Faculty members cannot vote for a candidate from their own department. After the election, it was observed that Prof. Pakrasi received 3 votes, Prof. Qureshi received 14 votes, Prof. Ramaswamy received 6 votes and Prof. Samuel received 1 vote. Prof. Pakrasi voted for Prof. Ramaswamy, Prof. Qureshi for Prof. Samuel, Prof. Ramaswamy for Prof. Qureshi and Prof. Samuel for Prof. Pakrasi. Which two candidates can belong to the same department?

Faculty members in a management school can belong to one of four departments – Finance and Accounting (F&A), Marketing and Strategy (M&S), Operations and Quants (O&Q) and Behaviour and Human Resources (B&H). The numbers of faculty members in F&A, M&S, O&Q and B&H departments are 9, 7, 5 and 3 respectively. Prof. Pakrasi, Prof. Qureshi, Prof. Ramaswamy and Prof. Samuel are four members of the school's faculty who were candidates for the post of the Dean of the school. Only one of the candidates was from O&Q. Every faculty member, including the four candidates, voted for the post. In each department, all the faculty members who were not candidates voted for the same candidate. The rules for the election are listed below. 1. There cannot be more than two candidates from a single department. 2. A candidate cannot vote for himself/herself. 3. Faculty members cannot vote for a candidate from their own department. After the election, it was observed that Prof. Pakrasi received 3 votes, Prof. Qureshi received 14 votes, Prof. Ramaswamy received 6 votes and Prof. Samuel received 1 vote. Prof. Pakrasi voted for Prof. Ramaswamy, Prof. Qureshi for Prof. Samuel, Prof. Ramaswamy for Prof. Qureshi and Prof. Samuel for Prof. Pakrasi. Which two candidates can belong to the same department?

Faculty members in a management school can belong to one of four departments – Finance and Accounting (F&A), Marketing and Strategy (M&S), Operations and Quants (O&Q) and Behaviour and Human Resources (B&H). The numbers of faculty members in F&A, M&S, O&Q and B&H departments are 9, 7, 5 and 3 respectively. Prof. Pakrasi, Prof. Qureshi, Prof. Ramaswamy and Prof. Samuel are four members of the school's faculty who were candidates for the post of the Dean of the school. Only one of the candidates was from O&Q. Every faculty member, including the four candidates, voted for the post. In each department, all the faculty members who were not candidates voted for the same candidate. The rules for the election are listed below. 1. There cannot be more than two candidates from a single department. 2. A candidate cannot vote for himself/herself. 3. Faculty members cannot vote for a candidate from their own department. After the election, it was observed that Prof. Pakrasi received 3 votes, Prof. Qureshi received 14 votes, Prof. Ramaswamy received 6 votes and Prof. Samuel received 1 vote. Prof. Pakrasi voted for Prof. Ramaswamy, Prof. Qureshi for Prof. Samuel, Prof. Ramaswamy for Prof. Qureshi and Prof. Samuel for Prof. Pakrasi. Which two candidates can belong to the same department?

Five restaurants, coded R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5 gave integer ratings to five gig workers – Ullas, Vasu, Waman, Xavier and Yusuf, on a scale of 1 to 5. The means of the ratings given by R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5 were 3.4, 2.2, 3.8, 2.8 and 3.4 respectively. The summary statistics of these ratings for the five workers is given below.

A visa processing office (VPO) accepts visa applications in four categories – US, UK, Schengen, and Others. The applications are scheduled for processing in twenty 15-minute slots starting at 9:00 am and ending at 2:00 pm. Ten applications are scheduled in each slot. There are ten counters in the office, four dedicated to US applications, and two each for UK applications, Schengen applications and Others applications. Applicants are called in for processing sequentially on a first-come-first-served basis whenever a counter gets freed for their category. The processing time for an application is the same within each category. But it may vary across the categories. Each US and UK application requires 10 minutes of processing time. Depending on the number of applications in a category and time required to process an application for that category, it is possible that an applicant for a slot may be processed later. On a particular day, Ira, Vijay and Nandini were scheduled for Schengen visa processing in that order. They had a 9:15 am slot but entered the VPO at 9:20 am. When they entered the office, exactly six out of the ten counters were either processing applications, or had finished processing one and ready to start processing the next. Mahira and Osman were scheduled in the 9:30 am slot on that day for visa processing in the Others category. The following additional information is known about that day. 1. All slots were full. 2. The number of US applications was the same in all the slots. The same was true for the other three categories. 3. 50% of the applications were US applications. 4. All applicants except Ira, Vijay and Nandini arrived on time. 5. Vijay was called to a counter at 9:25 am.

A visa processing office (VPO) accepts visa applications in four categories – US, UK, Schengen, and Others. The applications are scheduled for processing in twenty 15-minute slots starting at 9:00 am and ending at 2:00 pm. Ten applications are scheduled in each slot. There are ten counters in the office, four dedicated to US applications, and two each for UK applications, Schengen applications and Others applications. Applicants are called in for processing sequentially on a first-come-first-served basis whenever a counter gets freed for their category. The processing time for an application is the same within each category. But it may vary across the categories. Each US and UK application requires 10 minutes of processing time. Depending on the number of applications in a category and time required to process an application for that category, it is possible that an applicant for a slot may be processed later. On a particular day, Ira, Vijay and Nandini were scheduled for Schengen visa processing in that order. They had a 9:15 am slot but entered the VPO at 9:20 am. When they entered the office, exactly six out of the ten counters were either processing applications, or had finished processing one and ready to start processing the next. Mahira and Osman were scheduled in the 9:30 am slot on that day for visa processing in the Others category. The following additional information is known about that day. 1. All slots were full. 2. The number of US applications was the same in all the slots. The same was true for the other three categories. 3. 50% of the applications were US applications. 4. All applicants except Ira, Vijay and Nandini arrived on time. 5. Vijay was called to a counter at 9:25 am.

A visa processing office (VPO) accepts visa applications in four categories – US, UK, Schengen, and Others. The applications are scheduled for processing in twenty 15-minute slots starting at 9:00 am and ending at 2:00 pm. Ten applications are scheduled in each slot. There are ten counters in the office, four dedicated to US applications, and two each for UK applications, Schengen applications and Others applications. Applicants are called in for processing sequentially on a first-come-first-served basis whenever a counter gets freed for their category. The processing time for an application is the same within each category. But it may vary across the categories. Each US and UK application requires 10 minutes of processing time. Depending on the number of applications in a category and time required to process an application for that category, it is possible that an applicant for a slot may be processed later. On a particular day, Ira, Vijay and Nandini were scheduled for Schengen visa processing in that order. They had a 9:15 am slot but entered the VPO at 9:20 am. When they entered the office, exactly six out of the ten counters were either processing applications, or had finished processing one and ready to start processing the next. Mahira and Osman were scheduled in the 9:30 am slot on that day for visa processing in the Others category. The following additional information is known about that day. 1. All slots were full. 2. The number of US applications was the same in all the slots. The same was true for the other three categories. 3. 50% of the applications were US applications. 4. All applicants except Ira, Vijay and Nandini arrived on time. 5. Vijay was called to a counter at 9:25 am.

A visa processing office (VPO) accepts visa applications in four categories – US, UK, Schengen, and Others. The applications are scheduled for processing in twenty 15-minute slots starting at 9:00 am and ending at 2:00 pm. Ten applications are scheduled in each slot. There are ten counters in the office, four dedicated to US applications, and two each for UK applications, Schengen applications and Others applications. Applicants are called in for processing sequentially on a first-come-first-served basis whenever a counter gets freed for their category. The processing time for an application is the same within each category. But it may vary across the categories. Each US and UK application requires 10 minutes of processing time. Depending on the number of applications in a category and time required to process an application for that category, it is possible that an applicant for a slot may be processed later. On a particular day, Ira, Vijay and Nandini were scheduled for Schengen visa processing in that order. They had a 9:15 am slot but entered the VPO at 9:20 am. When they entered the office, exactly six out of the ten counters were either processing applications, or had finished processing one and ready to start processing the next. Mahira and Osman were scheduled in the 9:30 am slot on that day for visa processing in the Others category. The following additional information is known about that day. 1. All slots were full. 2. The number of US applications was the same in all the slots. The same was true for the other three categories. 3. 50% of the applications were US applications. 4. All applicants except Ira, Vijay and Nandini arrived on time. 5. Vijay was called to a counter at 9:25 am.

A visa processing office (VPO) accepts visa applications in four categories – US, UK, Schengen, and Others. The applications are scheduled for processing in twenty 15-minute slots starting at 9:00 am and ending at 2:00 pm. Ten applications are scheduled in each slot. There are ten counters in the office, four dedicated to US applications, and two each for UK applications, Schengen applications and Others applications. Applicants are called in for processing sequentially on a first-come-first-served basis whenever a counter gets freed for their category. The processing time for an application is the same within each category. But it may vary across the categories. Each US and UK application requires 10 minutes of processing time. Depending on the number of applications in a category and time required to process an application for that category, it is possible that an applicant for a slot may be processed later. On a particular day, Ira, Vijay and Nandini were scheduled for Schengen visa processing in that order. They had a 9:15 am slot but entered the VPO at 9:20 am. When they entered the office, exactly six out of the ten counters were either processing applications, or had finished processing one and ready to start processing the next. Mahira and Osman were scheduled in the 9:30 am slot on that day for visa processing in the Others category. The following additional information is known about that day. 1. All slots were full. 2. The number of US applications was the same in all the slots. The same was true for the other three categories. 3. 50% of the applications were US applications. 4. All applicants except Ira, Vijay and Nandini arrived on time. 5. Vijay was called to a counter at 9:25 am.

The schematic diagram below shows 12 rectangular houses in a housing complex. House numbers are mentioned in the rectangles representing the houses. The houses are located in six columns – Column-A through Column-F, and two rows – Row-1 and Row-2. The houses are divided into two blocks - Block XX and Block YY. The diagram also shows two roads, one passing in front of the houses in Row-2 and another between the two blocks. Some of the houses are occupied. The remaining ones are vacant and are the only ones available for sale. The road adjacency value of a house is the number of its sides adjacent to a road. For example, the road adjacency values of C2, F2, and B1 are 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The neighbour count of a house is the number of sides of that house adjacent to occupied houses in the same block. For example, E1 and C1 can have the maximum possible neighbour counts of 3 and 2, respectively. The base price of a vacant house is Rs. 10 lakhs if the house does not have a parking space, and Rs. 12 lakhs if it does. The quoted price (in lakhs of Rs.) of a vacant house is calculated as (base price) + 5 × (road adjacency value) + 3 × (neighbour count). The following information is also known. 1. The maximum quoted price of a house in Block XX is Rs. 24 lakhs. The minimum quoted price of a house in block YY is Rs. 15 lakhs, and one such house is in Column-E. 2. Row-1 has two occupied houses, one in each block. 3. Both houses in Column-E are vacant. Each of Column-D and Column-F has at least one occupied house. 4. There is only one house with parking space in Block YY.

The schematic diagram below shows 12 rectangular houses in a housing complex. House numbers are mentioned in the rectangles representing the houses. The houses are located in six columns – Column-A through Column-F, and two rows – Row-1 and Row-2. The houses are divided into two blocks - Block XX and Block YY. The diagram also shows two roads, one passing in front of the houses in Row-2 and another between the two blocks. Some of the houses are occupied. The remaining ones are vacant and are the only ones available for sale. The road adjacency value of a house is the number of its sides adjacent to a road. For example, the road adjacency values of C2, F2, and B1 are 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The neighbour count of a house is the number of sides of that house adjacent to occupied houses in the same block. For example, E1 and C1 can have the maximum possible neighbour counts of 3 and 2, respectively. The base price of a vacant house is Rs. 10 lakhs if the house does not have a parking space, and Rs. 12 lakhs if it does. The quoted price (in lakhs of Rs.) of a vacant house is calculated as (base price) + 5 × (road adjacency value) + 3 × (neighbour count). The following information is also known. 1. The maximum quoted price of a house in Block XX is Rs. 24 lakhs. The minimum quoted price of a house in block YY is Rs. 15 lakhs, and one such house is in Column-E. 2. Row-1 has two occupied houses, one in each block. 3. Both houses in Column-E are vacant. Each of Column-D and Column-F has at least one occupied house. 4. There is only one house with parking space in Block YY.

The schematic diagram below shows 12 rectangular houses in a housing complex. House numbers are mentioned in the rectangles representing the houses. The houses are located in six columns – Column-A through Column-F, and two rows – Row-1 and Row-2. The houses are divided into two blocks - Block XX and Block YY. The diagram also shows two roads, one passing in front of the houses in Row-2 and another between the two blocks. Some of the houses are occupied. The remaining ones are vacant and are the only ones available for sale. The road adjacency value of a house is the number of its sides adjacent to a road. For example, the road adjacency values of C2, F2, and B1 are 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The neighbour count of a house is the number of sides of that house adjacent to occupied houses in the same block. For example, E1 and C1 can have the maximum possible neighbour counts of 3 and 2, respectively. The base price of a vacant house is Rs. 10 lakhs if the house does not have a parking space, and Rs. 12 lakhs if it does. The quoted price (in lakhs of Rs.) of a vacant house is calculated as (base price) + 5 × (road adjacency value) + 3 × (neighbour count). The following information is also known. 1. The maximum quoted price of a house in Block XX is Rs. 24 lakhs. The minimum quoted price of a house in block YY is Rs. 15 lakhs, and one such house is in Column-E. 2. Row-1 has two occupied houses, one in each block. 3. Both houses in Column-E are vacant. Each of Column-D and Column-F has at least one occupied house. 4. There is only one house with parking space in Block YY.

The schematic diagram below shows 12 rectangular houses in a housing complex. House numbers are mentioned in the rectangles representing the houses. The houses are located in six columns – Column-A through Column-F, and two rows – Row-1 and Row-2. The houses are divided into two blocks - Block XX and Block YY. The diagram also shows two roads, one passing in front of the houses in Row-2 and another between the two blocks. Some of the houses are occupied. The remaining ones are vacant and are the only ones available for sale. The road adjacency value of a house is the number of its sides adjacent to a road. For example, the road adjacency values of C2, F2, and B1 are 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The neighbour count of a house is the number of sides of that house adjacent to occupied houses in the same block. For example, E1 and C1 can have the maximum possible neighbour counts of 3 and 2, respectively. The base price of a vacant house is Rs. 10 lakhs if the house does not have a parking space, and Rs. 12 lakhs if it does. The quoted price (in lakhs of Rs.) of a vacant house is calculated as (base price) + 5 × (road adjacency value) + 3 × (neighbour count). The following information is also known. 1. The maximum quoted price of a house in Block XX is Rs. 24 lakhs. The minimum quoted price of a house in block YY is Rs. 15 lakhs, and one such house is in Column-E. 2. Row-1 has two occupied houses, one in each block. 3. Both houses in Column-E are vacant. Each of Column-D and Column-F has at least one occupied house. 4. There is only one house with parking space in Block YY.

The schematic diagram below shows 12 rectangular houses in a housing complex. House numbers are mentioned in the rectangles representing the houses. The houses are located in six columns – Column-A through Column-F, and two rows – Row-1 and Row-2. The houses are divided into two blocks - Block XX and Block YY. The diagram also shows two roads, one passing in front of the houses in Row-2 and another between the two blocks. Some of the houses are occupied. The remaining ones are vacant and are the only ones available for sale. The road adjacency value of a house is the number of its sides adjacent to a road. For example, the road adjacency values of C2, F2, and B1 are 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The neighbour count of a house is the number of sides of that house adjacent to occupied houses in the same block. For example, E1 and C1 can have the maximum possible neighbour counts of 3 and 2, respectively. The base price of a vacant house is Rs. 10 lakhs if the house does not have a parking space, and Rs. 12 lakhs if it does. The quoted price (in lakhs of Rs.) of a vacant house is calculated as (base price) + 5 × (road adjacency value) + 3 × (neighbour count). The following information is also known. 1. The maximum quoted price of a house in Block XX is Rs. 24 lakhs. The minimum quoted price of a house in block YY is Rs. 15 lakhs, and one such house is in Column-E. 2. Row-1 has two occupied houses, one in each block. 3. Both houses in Column-E are vacant. Each of Column-D and Column-F has at least one occupied house. 4. There is only one house with parking space in Block YY.